The Middle East at a crossroads : how to face the perils of nuclear development in a volatile region by MALLARD, Grégoire & FORADORI, Paolo
PO
LI
CY
globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu
BR
IE
F
The Middle East at a Crossroads: 
How to Face the Perils of Nuclear 
Development in a Volatile 
Region
Authors: Grégoire Mallard and Paolo Foradori1
Highlights
The global nuclear regime may have reached a crossroads: the state 
parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) have called 
for the establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone 
(WMDFZ) in the Middle East. Failure to move forward could imperil 
the global nonproliferation architecture. At the same time, little thought 
has been given to how this regional organisation would work both in-
ternally (with its member-states) and externally (with other organisa-
tions, like the International Atomic Energy Agency - IAEA). Now that 
the international community and Iran have reached a deal in Geneva 
over a phased verification of the peaceful character of Iran’s nuclear 
programme, the negotiation needs to address broader regional issues. 
In this policy brief, we review the obstacles and windows of opportu-
nity for a comprehensive regional nuclear settlement by drawing les-
sons from recent history in Europe. In particular, we draw lessons from 
the history of the European Community of Atomic Energy (Euratom) 
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to suggest how a future regional organisation with jurisdiction in all as-
pects of nuclear development should articulate its functions with existing 
international organisations, like the IAEA. 
We also try to address the following questions: can the political provisions 
included in the Euratom Treaty inspire the Middle East? Are there specific 
technical agencies that would serve a useful role to establish trust in the 
Middle East? In Europe, we find that regional institutions have played a 
crucial role in creating trust among former warring nations. Even if more 
than a new regional organisation would be needed for nuclear disarma-
ment to start in the Middle East, a Euratom-like organisation would be a 
great step that would allow the prevention of future crises and the possible 
resolution of present crises. 
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Background
The “Nuclear Renaissance”
Nuclear energy is on the rise, and with the develop-
ment of new nuclear power plants projects, especially 
in volatile regions like the Middle East, new security 
concerns are likely to dominate international affairs 
in the coming years. The IAEA estimates that by 
2030, the production of electricity through the use of 
nuclear energy will increase from 25 per cent (nega-
tive scenario) to more than 90 per cent (positive 
scenario) compared to 2007.2 The Fukushima acci-
dent has only slowed down this overall medium-long 
term trend. The spread of nuclear energy involves 
primarily some fast-growing Asian economies, but it 
concerns the Middle East region, too. Over the past 
five years, at least thirteen countries in the region – 
from Morocco and Egypt, to Qatar and Saudi Arabia 
– have announced new or renewed plans to explore 
the use of nuclear energy. The United Arab Emirates 
are at the forefront and are progressing successfully 
with their programme to have four nuclear reactors 
in operation by 2020, while Egypt has just announced 
its intention to boost its nuclear ambitions with the 
launch of its first power-generating nuclear plant in 
Dabaa.
Under normal circumstances, the spread of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes should not be cause 
for particular concern - and in fact article IV of the 
Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) encourages it. There 
are several stated “good” reasons for this Middle East 
“nuclear renaissance” including: the need to diversify 
energy sources to meet growing domestic demand for 
electricity and address environmental concerns, the 
2. IAEA, Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates 
for the Period up to 2030, Vienna, July 2007. See also C. 
Ebinger et. al., Models for Aspirant Civil Nuclear En-
ergy Nations in the Middle East, Policy Brief, No. 11-01, 
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 2011.
possibility for maximising exports of its oil and gas 
resources, the exploitation of nuclear technologies for 
water desalination, as well as national prestige. 
But in the complex, unstable and problematic 
Middle East context a possible “nuclear renaissance” 
represents a potential non-proliferation challenge. 
The problem is well known and has to do with the 
inherently “dual-use” nature of nuclear energy, 
whereby knowledge and technology necessary for 
peaceful uses of the atom are essentially the same as 
those used to produce a bomb. For instance, Iran’s 
neighbours see with distress the country’s slow but 
steady advances in its nuclear programme, which 
include heavy investments in nuclear fuel cycle tech-
nologies that - like uranium enrichment centrifugal 
technologies - are essential to master for a country 
with nuclear military ambitions. Thus, if it is hard 
to predict how many of the countries in the Middle 
East will implement their nuclear programmes, the 
prospects of a “nuclear renaissance” in this region 
underline the urgency of holding renewed discus-
sions on a nuclear governance framework that can 
help buttress confidence and stability in the region. 
The Proposal for a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free 
Zone in the Middle East 
If the “nuclear renaissance” in the Middle East makes 
the creation of a regional nuclear security framework 
more timely, the idea of establishing a regional regu-
latory authority in nuclear affairs was first proposed 
well before Middle Eastern states anticipated devel-
oping nuclear energy on an industrial scale: in the 
mid-1970s, Iran and Egypt were the first to propose 
a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle 
East by sponsoring a 1974 UN General Assembly 
resolution. The initial proposal was expanded in 
1990 to include all categories of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), in addition to nuclear ones, on 
the initiative of the then Egyptian president Hosni 
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Mubarak, who acknowledged the threat posed by 
the presence of chemical and biological weapons 
in the region and the need to attract the support of 
Israel and the United States by encouraging posi-
tive trade-offs in a Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) disarmament process. Later on, during 
the 1995 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review 
and Extension Conference, under the leadership of 
Egypt, many Arab and non-aligned countries condi-
tioned their support for the indefinite extension of 
the NPT on a resolution that in clear language calls 
on non-NPT signatories to accede to the Treaty and 
accept full-scope IAEA safeguards (an obvious refer-
ence to Israel). The resolution additionally urges all 
members to fully cooperate with regional efforts to 
establish “an effectively verifiable Middle East zone 
free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chem-
ical and biological, and their delivery systems.”3 
For negotiations on the contours of the Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) to start now, 
however, formidable obstacles must be overcome 
(see Box 1). Additionally, if (and when) the discus-
sion on the WMDFZ will progress, it will become 
rapidly clear that important and unforeseen prob-
lems must be tackled in the context of the Middle 
East, especially if the region succeeds in a “nuclear 
renaissance”. Indeed, so far, the WMDFZ concept 
directly comes from a traditional arms control 
3. Resolution of the Middle East Conference of the State 
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, New York, May 11, 1995, NPT/CONF. 1995/32/
RES/1, http://www.un.org/Depts/ddar/nptconf/21c6.htm
Box 1: The Disappointing Failure of the 2012 Conference on a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East
Despite the fact that all regional states and the main external powers have expressed support for the project, little or no 
progress was achieved for the next 15 years. Long years of inaction, rhetorical support and unproductive talks were shaken 
in the last NPT Review Conference of 2010, and some first “practical steps” were agreed upon in the Final Document of this 
conference. These included the decision to call on the UN Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution 
(the US, the UK and Russia), in consultation with the states of the region, to convene a conference in 2012 on the establish-
ment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. The UN Secretary-General 
was additionally required to appoint a facilitator with a mandate to support implementation of the 1995 Resolution and 
undertake preparations for the 2012 Conference.1 In October 2011, after a long period of silence and apparent inactivity, 
Finland was designated as the host country, and the Finnish Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Jaakko Laajava as the facilitator 
of the event. The facilitator and his team soon embarked on intense diplomatic activity in consultation with the countries 
of the region, seeking their support for the conference. However, by the end of 2012 preparations for the conference had 
been aborted. Russia stated that “not all countries in the Middle East have agreed to participate.”2 The UK suggested “more 
preparation and engagement between states of the region will be necessary to secure arrangements that are satisfactory to 
all.”3 The US explained that the indefinite postponement was due to “present conditions in the Middle East and the fact that 
states in the region have not agreed on acceptable conditions.”4 Ambassador Laajava pledged to continue efforts “to prepare 
the ground for the earliest possible convening of a successful conference, to be attended by all states of the region.”5 
1. See NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)
2. See “Press Statement on the 2012 Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Moscow, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, November 24.
3. See “Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone Conference,” London, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, November 24.
4. See Nuland, Vitoria, “2012 Conference on a Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (MEWMDFZ),” Washington, D.C., U.S. Department 
of State, November 23.
5. See “Helsinki Middle East Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press release 282/2012, November 24.
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perspective, which aims at overcoming the issue of 
a WMD race in a radical and definitive fashion, by 
imposing an absolute prohibition on the production, 
possession, transfer, deployment and testing of any 
nuclear weapon or other weapons of mass destruc-
tion, including delivery systems. 
But this concept does not tackle all the problems that 
are traditionally associated with the development of 
dual-use technologies (especially nuclear fuel cycle 
technologies). To work well, a WMDFZ presupposes 
that the production of nuclear energy (as well as the 
production of chemical and bio- agents) is frozen, 
and not multiplying continually with the addition 
of new projects. If countries of the Middle East 
realise their promises of nuclear development, then, 
the governance structure of such a Zone should be 
designed to ensure continued transparency and 
trust despite such nuclear development. Rather than 
being a simple verification mechanism that will 
regulate what already exists, the governance bodies 
of such a Zone will need to actively participate in 
the design of future projects, which would inevitably 
raise concerns over the protection of the state sover-
eignty of its members.
Key Issues
The obstacles to a WMDFZ are formidable, 
numerous, and long-standing.4 The Middle East is 
a highly troubled, militarised region that has expe-
rienced intense inter- and intrastate violence, terri-
torial disputes, foreign meddling and intervention, 
ethnic and sectarian rivalries, and general political 
instability resulting from precarious domestic legiti-
macy. Regional cooperation and integration are 
minimal. In this problematic context, it has proved 
4. This section largely draws on Paolo Foradori and Martin 
B. Malin, A WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East: Creating 
the Conditions for Sustained Progress, Discussion Paper, 
The Project on Managing the Atom, 16, Harvard Univer-
sity, Cambridge, MA, 2012.
impossible to make any substantial progress in arms 
control negotiations over nonconventional weapons. 
Three main sets of issues deserve to be carefully 
considered. 
State Sovereignty Issues
The first and most fundamental challenge is repre-
sented by the belief among regional players in the 
desirability of WMDs for the protection of state 
sovereignty against all kinds of threats. As such, 
WMDs and their delivery systems are perceived as 
being credible deterrents against external threats, as 
a force equaliser compensating conventional mili-
tary capabilities, as a prestige and status enhancer, 
and as a product of domestic politics dynamics. 
The evidence of these ways of thinking is found in 
patterns of pursuit, acquisition, use and continued 
possession of a range of WMDs. 
Overall, Israel’s nuclear policy and the controversial 
Iranian nuclear programme represent the greatest 
examples of how concerns for protecting absolute 
state sovereignty over a territory are interconnected 
in the pursuit of WMDs or of their capabilities. For 
Israel, the Bomb is the ultimate guarantor of its 
survival in a region of hostile neighbours, some of 
whom do not recognise its right to exist. Israel insists 
on possessing options for the defence of its sover-
eignty that are independent of external aid. In this 
regard, Israel’s nukes are thought to provide a long-
term insurance policy against existential threats and 
to deter a massive conventional attack.5
While Iran continues to declare that its programme 
is for peaceful purposes, its neighbours and the inter-
national community are suspicious of Tehran’s real 
intentions. For some observers, Iran’s willingness to 
incur such high costs to push forward the develop-
5. Cohen, Avner (2010), The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel’s Bar-
gain with the Bomb (New York: Columbia University 
Press), pp. 77-78. 
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ment of a full array of fuel-cycle facilities suggests 
that, at a minimum, Iranian leaders wish to “hedge 
their bets,” 6 that is, achieve a capability that would 
enable the acquisition of nukes relatively quickly, if at 
a later date it chooses to do so. Its consistent pursuit 
of such technologies despite the high costs leads 
some to believe that it sees in the acquisition of such 
technologies a way to defend its state sovereignty, 
once and for all, in a way not unlike how Israel views 
its own nuclear weapons. Even if the recent agree-
ment struck between Iran and the P5+1 (the five 
members of the UN Security Council and Germany) 
in Geneva reflects a consensus on the desirability to 
offer Iran the chance to prove the peaceful character 
of its nuclear programme, both sides agree that many 
other steps need to be negotiated before the interna-
tional community can safely rule out the possibility 
that Iran may pursue the goal of acquiring nuclear 
weapons.
The same may be true of Bashar Al-Assad’s percep-
tion of chemical weapons. The use of chemical 
weapons in the Syrian civil war is the most recent 
manifestation of the inhumane and highly destabi-
lising nature of WMDs, but also a proof that these 
weapons are seen as a powerful tool to ensure the 
regime’s continued sovereignty over (most of) its 
territory, despite continued months of civil war. 
In sum, there is evidence that WMDs and their 
delivery systems play an important role in the secu-
rity calculations of several states, which hope to 
maintain their absolute state sovereignty and regime 
stability thanks to their possession (and use). This 
consideration, in turn, explains not only the mistrust 
among regional leaders about the intentions and 
interests of their neighbours, but also the low degree 
of regional cooperation. 
6. Levite, Ariel (2002/03), “Never Say Never Again: Nu-
clear Reversal Revisited,” International Security, Vol. 27, 
No. 3, p. 69.
As long as there is no agreement that state sover-
eignty should not be conceived in absolute terms (as 
if the choice was between having complete sover-
eignty or no sovereignty at all), the discussion of the 
vast array of issues in need of resolution to estab-
lish a WMDFZ will require an inordinate amount 
of international wrangling to get the parties to the 
negotiating table. Indeed, no progress will be made 
on the road toward verified nuclear disarmament if 
states cling to the wrong perception that they will 
lose power by engaging in international cooperative 
development. 
Political Instability
A second major challenge has to do with the poten-
tially adverse impact of the so-called “Arab Spring”. 
The risk is that the revolutionary transitions sweeping 
through the Middle East will bring more uncertainty 
and instability, including the prospects of near-
term negotiations on the schedule and agenda of a 
conference on a future WMDFZ in the Middle East. 
The recent revolutionary transitions caused a shift in 
the priorities of regional leaders from advancing the 
WMDFZ project, which received promising pros-
pects in the wake of the 2010 Non Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, to more pressing 
domestic issues. 
From Libya to Syria, from Egypt to Tunisia, from 
Yemen to Jordan, Arab revolutions have increased 
instability, thus making the picture even more prob-
lematic. For example, the ongoing conflict in Syria 
complicates the question of who will represent that 
country at such a WMDFZ conference. Despite the 
recent efforts to secure and dismantle Syria’s stocks 
of chemical weapons by the international commu-
nity, and in particular by the Organisation for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Assad govern-
ment will be hesitant to sit at the table with Arab 
League states that are calling for him to step down, 
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while Syria’s membership in the League has been 
suspended – and vice versa, other Arab states might 
refuse to negotiate with the Assad government. 
In addition, the possibility that Arab revolutions 
might radicalise domestic audiences towards hard-
line positions on WMD issues cannot be ruled out. 
Rising nationalist and populist sentiments in the 
Muslim civil society could hamper progress towards 
political dialogue and arms control. As noted by 
Michael Elleman, “The proverbial Arab street, 
empowered by recent political developments, will 
find it difficult to accept compromises that address 
Israel’s security concerns without a resolution of the 
Palestinian issue and Israel’s nuclear monopoly.”7
Verification Challenges
Finally, there exist formidable technical challenges 
in designing verification mechanisms that simul-
taneously apply to all three WMD categories and 
their delivery systems. What constitutes a WMD 
is uncertain. What a delivery system entails will be 
equally controversial to determine, given the asym-
metries in capability and geography, the emergence 
of new weapons such as unmanned aerial vehicles, 
the proliferation of cruise missile technology, and 
the progressive development of missile defenses.8 
The verification of the prohibitions of biological 
weapons is also an unresolved question, given the 
almost indistinguishable dual-use nature of biolog-
ical agents and infrastructure. It is no coincidence that 
7. Elleman, Michael (2012), “The Zone Is a Win-Win 
for All,” in Bilal Y. Saab, ed., The 2012 Conference on a 
Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle 
East. Prospects, Challenges, and Opportunities, a Special 
Roundtable Report (Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute 
of International Studies), http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/
pdfs/120731_mideast_wmdfz_conf_roundtable.pdf.
8. Kubbig, Bernd W., and Sven-Eric Fikenscher, eds. (2012), 
Arms Control and Missile Proliferation in the Middle East 
(New York: Routledge). 
the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
does not provide any verification mechanism. 
The issue of how to verify the irreversible disman-
tlement of the Israeli nuclear arsenal would present 
serious challenges, as well. The specific sequence 
of steps leading to the establishment of the zone 
continues to stand out as the most formidable 
conceptual as well as practical obstacle hampering 
progress, given a hard-to-reconcile divide between 
the Israeli ‘peace first, Zone second’ approach and 
the Arab/Iranian ‘Zone first, peace second’ approach. 
Experience from Other Regions and EURATOM: 
Reasons to Hope
Given the roadblocks to establishing such a Weapons 
of WMDFZ, this section considers some of the 
lessons learned from the existing Nuclear Weapons 
Free Zones (NWFZ) and especially from the expe-
rience of Euratom. Each case and zone around the 
world is unique and originates from different and 
specific conditions. There is no “one size fits all” 
package of attributes that can be used in the Middle 
East, and generalising from historical analogy must 
be approached with care. Still, a great deal of concep-
tual and practical experience is available and could 
be, mutatis mutandis, relevant to the Middle East 
context.9 
Unexpected Outcomes Are Always Possible
The history of arms control and the experience 
of the existing NWFZs suggest that conditions in 
other regions did not always appear conducive to 
progress on similar issues, and favourable and unex-
pected outcomes can occur even in highly unstable 
and complex situations. For example, the Latin 
9. IAEA. 2011. Forum on the experience of other regions 
in creating WMD-free zones, Vienna, November 21–22, 
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/misc/2011/
petersen221111.pdf
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American NWFZ, which was conceived within the 
highly volatile period of the Cuban missile crisis, was 
long blocked by the antagonism of the two nuclear-
capable and rival states of Argentina and Brasil.10 
As the IAEA observes, “establishment of Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) was possible despite 
serious obstacles, such as geopolitical complexities 
and lack of trust. This success was achieved through 
a combination of political will and commitment, 
dialogue, flexibility, and an incremental step-by-step 
approach”11.
Moreover, windows of opportunity can suddenly 
open, especially in time of a crisis or radical transfor-
mation. The sense of urgency associated with present-
day deteriorating situation of WMD in the Middle 
East can create incentives for regional and extra-
regional players to address WMD issues in good faith 
and with a renewed commitment. Signs of hope have 
also appeared in the last few months, like the present 
efforts to dismantle Syria’ stock of chemical weapons 
and the substantial progress in the negotiation for 
a comprehensive solution of the Iranian nuclear 
issue due to the the signing of a phased agreement in 
Geneva on 24 November 2013. Something of this sort 
happened in Latin America where the 1962 Cuban 
missile crisis catalysed efforts to establish a NWFZ. 
After the Geneva agreement of 24 November 2013, it 
is time for the international community (the US and 
the EU in particular) to engage Iran’s neighbours in a 
collective discussion about the peaceful uses that the 
region could draw from the Iranian nuclear capa-
bilities. Many of the issues could be addressed in the 
context of negotiations of a NWFZ to be established 
in the region.
10. For a balanced evaluation of the achievements of the 
established NWFZs, see Hamel-Green, Michael (2005), 
Regional Initiatives on Nuclear- and WMD-Free Zones 
(Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Re-
search). 
11.  See IAEA, 2011, “Summary.”
The Linkage of Democracy and Nonproliferation
The revolts sweeping through the Arab world are 
definitely creating more uncertainty and instability 
in the immediate and short term. However, assuming 
the Arab Spring’s final outcome is a more demo-
cratic and peaceful Middle East, and assuming that 
the recent governmental change in Iran confirms 
the democratic aspirations of this country, they can 
create an opportunity for progress in a longer-term 
perspective. Indeed, the experience from the existing 
NWFZs demonstrates how democratising countries 
are more likely to enter into regional arms control 
processes. For example, the political changes in 
South Africa, which led to the end of the apartheid 
regime, also led to a breakthrough in denuclearisa-
tion and the subsequent establishment of the African 
zone. Quite similarly, the Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was extended to the 
entire region only after the return to democracy by 
Brasil and Argentina. 
In this regard, the experience of Euratom also 
shows that the association between democratisa-
tion and the stabilisation of a regional framework 
can spur open interstate cooperation and verifiable 
technological development.12  Indeed, the Euratom 
Treaty was part of a series of treaties by which newly 
erected democracies in Europe sought to reinforce 
democratic forms of governance and establish trust 
among them in a post-war context characterised by 
massive investments in conventional and nuclear 
dual-use technological infrastructure industries. 
It was not a coincidence that the Euratom Treaty 
was signed by liberal democracies that feared that 
inter-state technological competition could under-
mine their internal democratic institutions (as in 
12. This section draws largely on Grégoire Mallard. 2008. 
“Can the Euratom Treaty Inspire the Middle East? The 
Promises of Nuclear Regional Authorities.” The Nonpro-
liferation Review. 15(3):459-477.
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the interwar period). Like the treaty establishing the 
Common Market, the Euratom one not only created 
research centres, a nuclear fuel procurement agency 
(the European Supply Agency), and a control agency, 
but also a whole democratic governance struc-
ture at the supranational level, which was inspired 
by the liberal theory of the division of powers: the 
executive powers of the Euratom Commission were 
balanced by the legislative powers of the Council of 
Ministers, where each nation was represented (and 
the European Parliament was also given a consulta-
tive role). Besides, the Euratom Treaty empowered 
individuals with the right to directly petition the 
European Court of Justice if they felt their rights, as 
defined by the Treaty, were violated. 
Then, the political aspects of the Euratom Treaty may 
have an even greater impact in the Middle East than 
its technical provisions, especially at a time when the 
protesters who participate in the Arab Spring seek to 
buttress the protection of their rights (like the right 
to be informed of biological or nuclear hazards) 
before courts of law. In a region where courts have 
often failed to fully protect citizens’ rights and have 
upheld states’ practices of opacity, giving access to 
new independent judiciary institutions can ensure 
that citizens’ demands for transparency will consist-
ently be heard by the authorities, and that those 
potentially affected by new nuclear power projects 
engaged by their neighbours will have a chance to 
defend their rights before a common regional court.
Besides, the predicted increase of nuclear power 
plants means that new non proliferation concerns are 
likely to emerge out of the “dual-use” characteristics of 
many nuclear projects. Hence, the governance struc-
ture of WMDFZ will need to include, like Euratom 
did, a democratic mechanism of ex ante coordina-
tion between states, equally represented in a regional 
Council, so that they can air their dispute before an 
independent Commission, and bring facts to the table. 
Strengthening Regional Verification Mechanisms
The experience in implementing NWFZs demon-
strates that confidence in the ability to verify the provi-
sions of a zone is a major requirement for successful nego-
tiation and implementation.13 Verification methods can 
13. See Lewis, Patricia, and William C. Potter (2011), “The 
Long Journey toward a WMD-Free Middle East,” Arms 
Box 2: Euratom Controls
Since the 1970s, after Euratom and the IAEA harmonised their system of safeguards, Euratom’s regional controls have 
worked more as complements to the IAEA controls than as substitutes. Since then, Euratom has managed (and still 
manages) most of the routine controls and it has enhanced trust and cooperation between states and their neighbours. 
The complementarity between Euratom’s regional controls and those of the IAEA was achieved after the NPT because the 
Euratom Treaty recognises the international legal sovereignty of this European Community, which means that Euratom 
can negotiate international agreements on behalf of its member states and sign agreements with international organisa-
tions. The legal sovereignty of Euratom allowed Euratom and the IAEA to harmonise their systems of controls, rather 
than subordinate one system of control to the other. Indeed, Euratom signed an agreement with the IAEA in 1973, as 
secured by Article 3.4. of the NPT, which allows the IAEA to negotiate with NPT signatory-states “collectively” about how 
the IAEA verifies the NPT obligation of Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). In the case of Europe, all Euratom NNWS 
signed the NPT in 1969 (although not France, which was a NWS), but they only ratified the NPT in 1975 after they had 
collectively bargained the exact terms of the IAEA-Euratom safeguards agreement in 1973. The legal sovereignty of the 
regional Community thus provided an opportunity for European nations to negotiate among themselves a common posi-
tion before entering into international contracts with international organisations. 
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be reinforced when mistrust is widespread, as is the 
case in the Middle East, and where there is the need 
to verify the dismantling of nuclear devices manu-
factured by a party before the entry into force of the 
Treaty, as was for the African zone and as would be 
true in the Israeli case. A multi-layered approach to 
verification involving a combination of international, 
regional, and bilateral commitments could be envi-
sioned for the Middle East. Again, the experience 
of NWFZs helps in this regard. Additional verifica-
tion and safeguards measures have been created in 
the Latin American zone, where a specialised agency 
was established, the Argentine-Brazilian Agency 
for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials 
(ABACC). 
In this regard, the experience of Euratom also 
represents an interesting precedent, which can help 
the Middle East escape the deadlock between the 
Israeli ‘peace first, Zone second’ approach and the 
Arab/Iranian ‘Zone first, peace second’ approach. 
The Euratom Treaty also created a control agency, 
with powers to trace the circulation of fissile mate-
rials within the Community; to help new national 
atomic energy commissions adopt good book-
keeping practices; to inspect the use of nuclear 
fuels in its territory; to report violations and decide 
sanctions. In this case, regional controls created 
the conditions of mutual confidence that allowed 
initially mistrusting European nations to accept that 
their nuclear programmes would be inspected. But 
Euratom controls did not prohibit military uses of 
nuclear fissile materials, as they imposed that all the 
uses (peaceful and military) of nuclear materials be 
reported to the Euratom control agency, and checked 
(see Box 2). 
This is an important lesson for those states in the 
Middle East who wish to engage Israel (the only 
non-Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) party in the 
Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/2011_09/
The_Long_Journey_Toward_A_WMD-Free_Middle_East
region) to become a full party to the NPT, and to 
submit all its peaceful nuclear activities to the watch 
of the IAEA. If, like in Euratom, a regional commu-
nity with legal sovereignty was created first in the 
Middle East; if it then proved that its control agency 
could operate to the satisfaction of its member-states 
(for instance, by conducting inspections in Iran); and 
if it would then be allowed to collectively negotiate 
the terms of new safeguards agreements between 
itself, its member-states and the IAEA, it could actu-
ally become a strong force working toward the crea-
tion of a WMDFZ in the Middle East. 
According to such plan, a WMDFZ with interna-
tional legal sovereignty would participate in the 
negotiations between the IAEA and Israel over the 
future controls of its civilian facilities, as well as of 
special fissionable materials previously used in the 
country’s military devices: the negotiation would 
thus be conducted collectively between the IAEA, 
the WMDFZ, and all member-states of that new 
regional organisation, and it would not exclude 
military nuclear activities from its jurisdiction. At 
the end of the process, all states (not just Israel and 
Iran) would have to sign a new trilateral safeguards 
agreement with both the Zone and the IAEA. This 
collective bargaining process would give Israel time 
to advance toward verified denuclearisation under a 
regional framework that could potentially convince 
it to ratify the NPT as a Non-Nuclear Weapon States 
(NNWS), if other security guarantees (provided by 
the Zone) were met. 
At last, another important feature that comes with 
Euratom’s power to control and inspect nuclear 
activities is its power to decide on sanctions (ranging 
from a notification by the inspectorate to the seizing 
of fissile materials unduly stored by a user) in case 
of verified security breaches. This power to sanc-
tion is important, as a regional agency with eyes to 
see security failures but no arms to repair violations 
11 ■ The Middle East at a Crossroads: How to Face the Perils of Nuclear Development in a Volatile Region
would be born half dead: then, all verified violations 
of security rules would have to be sent to the U.N. 
Security Council (as the IAEA does), with the corre-
sponding risks of politicisation and delayed response 
to security breaches. 
Policy Recommendations
1. Now that an agreement has been reached 
between the “P5+1” (the permanent member 
countries of the U.N. Security Council and 
Germany) and Iran, the “P5+1” should engage 
in broader consultations with Iran’s regional 
neighbours in order to facilitate the creation of a 
regional authority in charge of regulating nuclear 
development and verifying its peaceful character 
in the region.
2. All Middle East region states, including Iran, 
should propose a clear roadmap to establish a 
regional authority in charge of negotiating with 
the IAEA acceptable trilateral safeguards agree-
ments to be signed by themselves, the future 
WMDFZ’s governance bodies, and the IAEA.
3. When formulating a roadmap, all states of the 
region should clearly express their preferences 
for the kind of governance structure that will 
have authority over the implementation of the 
technical functions (safeguards, planning, fuel 
supply, research and development) under the 
jurisdiction of the future WMDFZ’s governance 
bodies. Their roadmap should help address both 
present concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme 
and future ones raised by the foreseen “nuclear 
renaissance” in the Arab world. To set up strong, 
sustainable and open institutions of nuclear 
governance in the region, each state should build 
upon the experience of Euratom as well as adapt 
that model to the cultural and political traditions 
of institution-building in the Middle East. 
4. The P5+1 should multiply efforts to organise a 
conference on the establishment of a WMDFZ in 
the Middle East before 2015. This conference will 
give the opportunity for all states to discuss their 
respective roadmaps and find common ground. 
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